Book Review: Common Sense and the Fifth Amendment by Lipson, Leon S.
BOOKS REVIEWED 
COMMON SENSE AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT. By Sidney Hook. 
New York: Criterion Books. i957. 60o pages. $3.00. 
For years Professor Hook has waged a public love-affair with 
the Goddess of Reason. Rival suitors, humbly aware that she does 
not always requite their passion, may be forgiven when they won- 
der on what evidence Professor Hook lays exclusive claim to her 
favors, and by what commission he has annointed himself High 
Priest of her temple. In recent utterances on political subjects, he 
has invoked the Goddess ritually against the massed attacking 
hordes of "ritualistic liberals." It almost seems as though he spent 
the greater part of his time belaying his allies because they get in 
the way of the blows that he might otherwise strike at their com- 
mon enemies. 
At the start of this slender though repetitious volume, Professor 
Hook has disarmed criticism and propitiated the Goddess by using 
"common sense" in the title; by dedicating the work to the mem- 
ory of Morris Raphael Cohen; by informing his readers that his 
position "expresses a common-sense truth which can be overlooked 
only by 'a trained incapacity,' to use Veblen's phrase, to see the ob- 
vious in a search for the historically recondite";1 and by proclaim- 
ing his standpoint as "that of unreconstructed liberalism which 
recognizes the primacy of morality to law, and the centrality of 
intelligence in morality.... Experience has shown that those 
who, no matter in what cause, are foes of intelligence are the foes 
of freedom, too."2 It turns out that the main target of the book is 
that old archfoe of intelligence, Dean Erwin N. Griswold of the 
Harvard Law School, who wrote a booklet on The Fifth Amend- 
ment Today3 and later dared to take issue with Professor Hook in 
a polemic in the New Leader.4 
I 
Reduced to brief compass, the grievance against Dean Gris- 
wold's booklet seems to be this: the Dean had asserted that the 
invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination before con- 
gressional investigating committees did not raise a conclusive in- 
1. P. 14. 
2. P. 15. 
3. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY (1955). See Crotty, Book Review, 7 STAN. L. REV. 422 (1955); Nossaman, Book Review, 7 STAN. L. REV. 429 (1955). 4. 39 NEW LEADER 20 (1956). 
July 1958] 785 
STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. io: Page 785 
ference that the witness was guilty. He had put two hypothetical 
illustrations: college teachers, one an ex-member of the Commu- 
nist party and the other a sometime member of front organizations 
but never a member of the party, both innocent of crime and with- 
out moral fault (unless, presumably, one insists on the "centrality 
of intelligence in morality"). He said that both teachers might, 
without committing contempt, claim the privilege when asked 
whether they were ever members of the party. And he asserted 
that an inference from the invocation of the privilege would be 
"unwarranted";5 he seemed to mean that an inference of criminal 
conduct would be unwarranted in both cases and an inference of 
past membership in the party would be unwarranted in case two 
(perhaps also unwarranted in case one though it would happen 
there to coincide with the fact). 
To the Dean's denial of a necessary inference Professor Hook 
retorts with an assertion, repeated dozens of times, that there is a 
rebuttable inference. The claim of the privilege is not conclusive 
evidence of anything, suggests the Dean; it is some evidence of 
something, proclaims the Professor.6 Has issue been joined? Pro- 
fessor Hook appears to think so. 
What is the content of the inference that according to Dean 
Griswold need not necessarily, and according to Professor Hook 
should reasonably but rebuttably, be drawn from a claim of the 
privilege? Suppose a witness is asked whether he has ever been 
a member of the Communist party, and "takes the fifth." Let us 
assume for the moment that no necessary inference follows. What 
is the normal or natural inference that Professor Hook says we 
ought to be prepared to make? Would it be most reasonable to 
infer that the witness has been, or believes he has been, a member? 
That he has committed, or believes he has committed, a crime? 
That he fears, with or without adequate reason, that a truthful 
answer would tend to incriminate him (of what?) though he is or 
5. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 19 (1955). 
6. So lightweight an inference does not satisfy Mr. R. Carter Pittman, who wrote a 
history of the privilege, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763 (1935), and returned to the subject in The Fifth Amendment: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 42 A.B.A.J. 509 (1956). He 
says, "It is still true that those who claim the privilege against self-incrimination are guilty 
of that about which they refuse to testify. That is the only respectable reason for claiming it." Id. at 510. Can one dissent from this opinion without joining the ranks of those whom, in another connection, Mr. Pittman describes as "the soft-shell egg-heads, the left-threaded 
screwballs, the pseudo-philosophers, the assorted 'doctors' of this and that, and those simple- 
minded people who believed themselves 'liberal' and 'broad-minded' when loving every 
other country except their own ...."? Id. at 592. 
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thinks he is innocent, or because he is or thinks he is guilty (of 
what?) ? 
A reading of Professor Hook's book gives no answer, because 
it gives too many clues, to Professor Hook's notion of the content 
of the normal and natural inference. It is phrased in different 
passages as "guilt or unfitness with respect to the issue in ques- 
tion";7 "guilt, with respect either to the specific question or to the 
class of related questions to which answers are refused";8 "guilty 
involvement";9 "guilt";1° "guilt with respect to the question at 
issue";" "the fact of membership";12 "involvement";l3 "guilt or 
involvement with respect to the issue under inquiry";4 "a deroga- 
tory conclusion."" It is hard to identify the common denotation. 
When we come to the context in which, and the purpose for 
which, the inference is to be drawn, we are faced again with a ques- 
tion to which no easy answer can be given. The many examples 
with which Professor Hook illustrates his one major point-that 
a rebuttable inference ought to be drawn-show how unamenable 
this question is to solution a priori. Even after the proper content 
of the inference is determined, the use to be made of it must depend 
on such things as the arena (criminal trial, civil litigation, adminis- 
trative hearing, political campaign, social club, and so on); on the 
burden of proof properly required to establish whatever fact is to 
be inferred; on the consequences of establishing that fact (convic- 
tion, bail, damages, dismissal, deportation, civil-service unemploy- 
ment, private unemployment,16 nonelection, ostracism, and so on); 
and, as always, on the other evidence available to help ascertain the 
fact in question. 
7. P. 13. 
8. P.30. 
9. P. 47. 
10. E.g., p. 52. 
11. P. 66. 
12. P. 78. 
13. P. 34. 
14. Ibid. 
15. P. 35. 
16. It is now generally thought that the invocation of the privilege by a university 
professor in response to a question about present, or perhaps also past, Communist party 
membership justifies administrative inquiry by some official of the university employing him. The presupposition is that the professor may fairly be asked to "tell all" in the 
privacy of the faculty lounge or the dean's office. If, however, the professor protests that his employer is not a privileged repository of his revelations and would have to repeat them upon congressional demand, should the university abandon the inquiry, discharge the professor, or commit its officials to a promise to go to jail rather than divulge the con- fidence being solicited? (I owe a debt to Professor Francis W. Coker, Jr., of Yale Law School, for recalling this problem to my attention.) 
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II 
It is time to reconsider and revise or at least rephrase the as- 
sumption, common to Professor Hook and Dean Griswold, that a 
claim of the privilege raises no necessary inference. Suppose we 
put it that the claim necessarily implies an alternative proposition, 
namely, that either the witness is legally entitled to invoke it or 
he is not; or, in other words, that either the witness has some fear 
that a truthful answer would tend to incriminate him or he has 
committed contempt. We are learning from the logicians that 
tautologies are not necessarily fruitless, and this one serves to bring 
into focus one aspect of the recent history of the privilege to which 
neither the Dean nor the Professor devotes much explicit attention. 
Professor Hook says that "almost all who invoke the privilege, 
independent evidence shows, were present or former members of 
the Communist Party."" The independent evidence is not ap- 
praised in detail or even, except for appended extracts from the 
transcript of the testimony of three witnesses, exhibited. On the 
basis of impressions from a reading of a good many transcripts I 
would invite attention to the following hypothesis, which would 
have to be tested by research: I suggest that of the witnesses who 
claimed the privilege when asked about present or former member- 
ship, the great majority had not committed espionage, treason, 
sabotage, or sedition; that almost as large a majority had not vio- 
lated the Smith Act; that a smaller number, probably still a ma- 
jority, were present or former members; that a large number, 
whether or not they were present or former members, feared that 
a truthful answer would tend to incriminate them or would expose 
them via "waiver" to the necessity of answering other questions to 
which the answers would be incriminating; and that a much larger 
number than seems to be generally recognized were in the strictest 
possible sense guilty of contempt18 because they had no honest fear 
of self-incrimination.19 
17. P. 109. 
18. Professor Hook does not allude to the probability that this has often been the 
case. He does mention the fact that if a witness were to claim the privilege without fearing 
self-incrimination he would be committing "perjury," a term which Professor Hook uses 
throughout in preference to "contempt." 
19. For a good portrayal of the necessarily confused advice that counsel would have 
to offer one type of witness, see Pollitt, Pleading the Fifth Amendment before a Congres- 
sional Committee: A Study and Explanation, 32 NOTRE DAME LAW. 43 (1956). For an 
argument belittling the differences between courtroom safeguards and the atmosphere at 
congressional committee hearings, and shrugging off the notion that Senator McCarthy was discourteous to witnesses, see Williams, The Fifth Amendment in Non-Criminal Proceed- 
ings, 39 MARQ. L. REV. 205, 215-17 (1956). 
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The fact that there were hardly any prosecutions for contempt 
against witnesses who invoked this privilege does not mean that 
contempt was not very often committed. It may mean only that in 
the current political circumstances it was more expedient for legis- 
lators to pretend that the invocation of the privilege was justified 
than to vindicate the integrity of their committee procedures by 
prosecution for contempt.20 There are grounds for wondering 
whether at least some witnesses who could be relied on to claim the 
privilege indiscriminately were asked sensational questions in order 
that the interrogative mood could be turned into the declarative 
(more suitable for committee reports and the evening headlines) 
simply by being bounced against the privilege. There are some 
grounds for believing also that some legislators and their staff en- 
couraged witnesses to claim the privilege even when the witnesses 
indicated that they intended rather to answer the questions or to 
avoid them by reference to some supposed right other than that 
afforded by the fifth amendment. 
III 
Professor Hook spends little space on the matter of waiver, 
though it bulks large in the literature and in the minds of counsel, 
as well as of some witnesses even without the advice of counsel, and 
is important in appraising the correctness of inferences. Many 
witnesses seem to have invoked the privilege in response to in- 
nocuous questions, upon advice or belief that their answers though 
they would not incriminate would open them up to connected 
questions to which they would have to give incriminating answers; 
they would be held to have waived their right to the privilege by 
failing to claim it before. Dean Griswold points out that in Rogers 
v. United States2 the Supreme Court expanded the scope of waiver 
to such a point that pending further clarification "the only safe 
advice may be to claim the privilege at the earliest possible moment 
»»22 
One consequence of this is to lower the reliability of an inference 
that the truthful answer to a given question on which the privilege 
has been invoked would be incriminating. Another consequence 
is that even though a witness may, in fear of waiver, invoke the 
20. See Note, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1454, 1456-57 (1957). 
21. 340 U.S. 367, 19 A.L.R.2d 378 (1951). 
22. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 24 (1955). 
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privilege on a question to which a truthful answer may be non- 
incriminating, the problem of inference is not resolved but only 
deferred, because at some point along the line of questioning he 
must either fear incrimination or be committing contempt. One is 
remitted again to the task of selection among possible inferences; 
this task, too, requires independent evidence and cannot be solved 
simply by applying to the claim of the privilege the naked intellect 
of the inferrer.23 
If the Rogers ruling is clarified, we may be able to say that there 
is no waiver until the witness has given an incriminating answer 
(as Dean Griswold suggests) and-more important, though much 
harder to apply-that waiver extends no further than the incrimi- 
nating effect of answers already given.24 Such an analysis might 
increase the proportion of cases in which we might guess that the 
witness had committed contempt and decrease the proportion in 
which we might guess that the privilege was justified (legally), 
but it would not necessarily advance us toward politically relevant 
inferences. 
IV 
In his sacerdotal capacity Professor Hook sniffs at the logical 
infirmities of his adversaries. He invites the reader "to see what 
is wrong with Dean Griswold's logical procedure";25 he reports 
that "the methodological error involved here has betrayed not 
only Dean Griswold but many others";26 he says that "regnant 
23. Professor Hook of course recognizes the necessity of bringing other evidence to 
bear on the appraisal of the rebuttable inference. The difficulty is that each such recog- 
nition tends to weaken the apparent cogency of the inference drawn from the claim of 
privilege alone. 
24. See Krogmann v. United States, 225 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1955). It is curious 
that Dean Griswold does not mention waiver as one of the reasons entitling the hypo- 
thetical teacher in his case two to claim the privilege where the truthful answer to 
the question of Communist membership would be "no." He gives two other reasons: 
first, the fear of prosecution for perjury in the act of saying "no"; second, the fear that, if 
he says "no," "then in his own interest he may have to undertake to state and explain his 
membership and activities in the various front organizations." GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH 
AMENDMENT TODAY 19 (1955). The first of these, as he rightly says, is not a proper 
reason. The second one I should suppose to be improper also, unless the Dean means by 
it to foreshadow his subsequent discussion of waiver. 
There is a conceivable circumstance, by the way, in which the fear of prosecution for 
perjury would be a valid ground for invocation of the privilege. Suppose that a witness 
has previously sworn that he was a member. If the true answer is "no," then giving the 
true answer now will tend to incriminate him by furnishing evidence toward a conviction 
of prior perjury. This freak situation also shows that it is possible that the privilege may 
be properly claimed though waiver is disregarded and the true answer to the question 
would be "no." 
25. P. 32. 
26. P. 33. 
790 
BOOKS REVIEWED 
doctrine about the self-incriminatory provision . . . is based upon 
an egregious fallacy."27 He beholds the mote but considers not the 
beam. 
For example, he discusses the case of two students at Harvard 
Law School who had invoked the privilege when asked whether 
they had held Communist meetings or collected Communist dues 
in their rooms at Harvard and writes: 
.... What could be inferred from the testimony of the Harvard 
twins? This: that the probability that they conducted Communist ac- 
tivity at "Harvard or Cornell" is at least as great as the probability that 
they conducted such activities at Cornell or that they conducted such 
activities at Harvard. It is this inference which is relevant to the pur- 
poses of the inquiry.28 
To a reader who lacks Professor Hook's technical equipment, it 
would seem that such an inference does not follow from anything 
that the two students did or said or did not do or say but is merely 
a loose version of an example of the "special addition theorem." 
The probability that Professor Hook and I conducted fascist activi- 
ties at "Harvard or Cornell" is at least as great as the probability 
that we conducted such activities at Cornell or that we conducted 
such activities at Harvard, no matter whether we deny, confess, 
claim a privilege, or stand mute. 
For another example, Professor Hook quotes Dean Griswold to 
the effect that "to rely only on 'common sense' in the administra- 
tion of justice would leave us not far removed from some of the 
People's Courts in other lands" and says, in the course of what pur- 
ports to be a retort; "sometimes we need to go beyond common 
sense but we cannot do without it."29 To a reader lacking Professor 
Hook's technical equipment it would seem that Dean Griswold had 
acknowledged this not very startling truth by using the word 
"only." 
Finally, Professor Hook says that the meaning of the privilege 
"will be more comprehensive or less depending upon how the jus- 
tices of the Supreme Court in the future interpret it. And since 
some of the opinions which have extended its meaning have been 
five to four decisions, it may very well be only one man who will 
fix its meaning in a given period."30 What technical term would 
27. P. 47. 
28. P. 36. 
29. Pp. 16-17. 
30. Pp. 22-23. 
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Professor Hook use for the fallacy involved in the supposition that 
the camel's back is broken by the last straw, or that the game is 
won by the player who kicks the odd point after touchdown? 
V 
All this does not mean that Professor Hook ought to be driven 
from the Temple of Reason, or even unfrocked. He has taken many 
words to prove but little; he has understated the complexity of the 
problem of selecting a reasonable inference among those that could 
be drawn from a claim of the privilege, neglected the importance 
of waiver, insufficiently particularized the many possible contexts 
and purposes of inference, and (in my view) overestimated the 
uniformity of the states of mind of present and past members of 
the Communist party; and he has displayed a certain want of 
charity toward his fellow-suitors. Yet he is no foe of freedom, or 
of intelligence, and I hope that the Goddess will show him more 
mercy than justice. 
LEON LIPSON* 
THE JOINT VENTURE AND TAX CLASSIFICATION. By Joseph Taub- 
man. New York: Federal Legal Publications, Inc. 957. xvii + 
493 pages. $15.00. 
This is a scholarly and thought-provoking book, partly a history, 
partly a description and analysis of tax and legal problems of com- 
bining for joint-venture activity. For the practicing attorney, it 
will review and sharpen his knowledge of certain concepts and 
principles which are a part of his stock-in-trade. For the oil-and- 
gas attorney, it will add little to what must already be known as 
a basis for competence in oil and gas. For the legal philosopher 
and the law professor, it is an attempt to define and classify "joint 
venture" as a separate legal concept rather than a subclassification 
of partnership. 
A joint venture, as defined by Mr. Taubman, is "an association 
of two or more natural or juridical persons to carry on as co-owners 
an enterprise, venture, or operation for the duration of that par- ticular transaction or series of transactions or for a limited time."1 
* Professor of Law, Yale University. 
1. P. 83. 
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